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BEGGING THY NEIGHBOUR: UNDERSTANDING CANADA'S
LIMITED OPTIONS IN RESOLVING 'BUY AMERICA'
Philip G. Turit

After subduing concerns over his campaign promise to re-negotiate the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),' few Canadians would
have expected President Barack Obama's landmark stimulus bill to open a
new chapter in Canada-United States trade relations. Indeed, tucked away in
the lengthy American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) 2 was
an emboldened "Buy America" policy that, for many Canadian exporters,
typified depression-era protectionism. In particular, Canadian companies
took issue with § 1605 of the ARRA, which restricted the availability of
funding appropriated under the legislation to public projects using "iron, steel
and manufactured goods" produced exclusively in the United States. While
domestic preference rules regarding government procurement were not necessarily new,4 the breadth and scope of this current provision is a marked
departure from past practice. Specifically, eighty percent of ARRA funding
for public infrastructure projects is distributed by state agencies and municipalities, the overwhelming majority of which are not covered by any international trade obligations.3 Under this legislative mandate, subfederal entities
are free, and in fact encouraged, to discriminate against Canadian suppliers
bidding on government contracts, notwithstanding the many agreements
promoting free trade between Canada and the United States.
The following note will examine three principal questions underlying this
most recent episode in Canada-United States trade relations. First, was the
t Philip Turi is a third year student at The University of Western Ontario, Faculty of Law.
Philip will be articling with Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP in Toronto after completing his
studies at Western Law.
1 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
[hereinafter NAFTA]; see generally Les Whittington, Obama Reassures Canadaon Trade and
Afghanistan, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 19, 2009, http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/
article/589906.
2 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2009) [hereinafter
ARRA].
' Id. § 1605.
4 See generally Buy America Act, 41 U.S.C § 10 (a-d) (1933).
5 Press Release, Embassy of Can., Buy America: Putting Jobs at Risk (June 2009) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Embassy of Canada].

238

CANADA-UNITED STATES LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 35, Nos. 1 & 2]

"Buy America" clause enacted under the ARRA consistent with United
States international legal obligations to Canada given that funding mandated
under the legislation emanated from the federal government? Second, what
legal options were available to Canada, on behalf of affected companies, in
response to "Buy America"? Third, to what extent does the Canada-United
States Agreement on Government Procurement (Canada-United States
AGP)6 signed in February 2010 engage the preceding issues and provide a
framework for managing future "Buy America" provisions?
This note will begin with a brief overview of the ARRA, itself, and the
distinction between § 1605 and other "Buy America" statutes and provisions.
Thereafter, it will examine the permissibility of a restrictive procurement
policy under NAFTA and the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) as well as examine other international accords covering treaty relations and state responsibility. 7 In addressing question two, the analysis is subdivided into options available to Canada
through: (1) the waiver criteria established under § 1605 (b) of the ARRA;
(2) executive order; (3) arbitration; and (4) countermeasures permissible under international law.
It will be argued below that prior to the signing of the Canada-United
States AGP, the main cause of Canada's difficulty was a lack of coverage
under both of its major trade agreements with the United States. With subfederal entities largely excluded from NAFTA Chapter 10 and the GPA, the
United States was not prima facie contravening obligations to Canada under
either agreement. Less clear, however, was whether § 1605 undermined
United States obligations to Canada under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).' While overriding political
considerations narrowed the range of legal remedies at Canada's disposal,
there was a clear legal basis in the United States for countrywide exemption
for Canada under executive order. Other alternatives, such as arbitration on a
state-to-state basis, were, although viable, prone to protraction beyond the
6 Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United

States on Government Procurement, U.S.-Can., Feb. 16, 2010, availableat
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/ENGCanada-USA%20Government%20Procurement%20%28clean%2011%20Feb%2020 10
%20printed%29.pdf [hereinafter Canada-United States AGP]; see also Press Release, Office
of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S., Canada Sign Agreement on Government Procurement,
(Feb. 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/february
/us-canada-sign-agreement-government-procurement.
Agreement on Government Procurement, April 15, 1994, 1915 U.N.T.S. 31876 [hereinafter GPA].
8 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 (1994), reprintedin
The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 275
(1999) [hereinafter SCM Agreement].
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time-sensitive ARRA's mandate. Furthermore, it is unclear whether enacting
countermeasures would have been in the best interest of Canadian companies, especially those with established cross-border supply chains. Finally,
while the Canada-United States AGP expands Canada's commitment to liberalizing subfederal procurement markets, it provides only marginal access to
remaining ARRA funding and does not prevent the United States from enacting future local content provisions with regards to procurement. Notwithstanding these issues, the Canada-United States AGP sets an important precedent and offers the prospect for further integration of procurement markets
in both countries.
1. GENERAL BACKGROUND: § 1605 AND EFFECTS ON CANADAUNITED STATES TRADE
The goals of the ARRA, as established in § 3(a), include promoting economic recovery, providing investments needed to increase economic efficiency, and investing in infrastructure that will provide long-term economic
benefits.9 The goal of efficiency is reiterated in § 3(b), where it is asserted
that expenditures and projects commence "as quickly as possible consistent
with prudent management." 0
Section 1605 of the ARRA attaches domestic content requirements to the
United States' $90 billion" in infrastructure funding for projects involving
the "construction, alteration, maintenance, or repair of a public work or public building."l 2 Subsection (b) provides federal agencies involved in administering funds with the ability to waive such requirements in three circumstances: (1) when applying the provision would be inconsistent with the public interest; (2) when domestically produced iron, steel, or relevant manufactured goods are of insufficient quantity or of unsatisfactory quality; or (3)
where the inclusion of domestically produced iron, steel, or manufactured
goods would serve to increase the cost of the overall project by more than
twenty-five percent.13 In an attempt to forestall the concerns of United States
trading partners, subsection (d) provides that § 1605 be applied in a manner
consistent with United States international trade obligations.
Although it is not entirely clear whether the insertion of provision 1605
was a response to the lobbying efforts of the American steel industryl4 or a
' ARRA § 3(a).
Id. § 3(b).

10

"

CANADIAN MANUFACTURERS AND EXPORTERS,

BuY AMERICAN

BRIEFING DOCUMENT

(May 25, 2009), availableat http://www.fairtradeforcanada.ca/files/pdfs/CMEEnglish.pdf.
12 ARRA § 1605.
'3 Id. § 1605 (1),(2),
(3).
14 Lesley Stahl, Could 'Buy American'Rule Spark Trade War? CBS NEWS,
February 15,
2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/02/13/60minutes/main4801257.shtml.
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general protectionist sentiment sweeping Congress, the disruptive effect of
the clause on United States trade with Canada was easier to ascertain. In
particular, unless a procuring entity interested in using Canadian product
received a waiver for such purposes from a Federal agency charged with
allotting funding, Canadian companies were practically ineligible from competing on ARRA funded projects." However, nearly one-third of trade between Canada and the United States is "intrafirm," and more than sixty percent of trade occurs within established cross-border supply chains.16 Accordingly, it is not surprising that by August 2009, with only ten percent of the
stimulus funding allocated, the legislation adversely affected approximately
250 Canadian and United States companies supplying state and municipal
infrastructure markets.' 7 Many of these Canadian companies were asked to
sign affidavits verifying where their products were manufactured. Furthermore, United States manufacturers selling directly to local infrastructure
markets requested that their Canadian suppliers sign similar affidavits.' 8
At the grassroots level, the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM)
responded to the "Buy America" clause by adopting a trade resolution calling
for discrimination against goods and suppliers from countries, such as the
United States, that had closed "previously open markets to Canadian
goods." 9 While the veracity of this resolution was never fully tested, it
served as an impetus for the eventual "Buy America" negotiations that ensued in the fall of 2009. Acting as an artificial deadline, the resolution, although never implemented, attracted the attention of policymakers on both
sides of the border.20
Unlike federal agencies administering their own procurements, most state
and municipal governments neither issued nor implemented complex "Buy
America"-type provisions in the past. Section 1605's application to subfederal entities thus created significant uncertainty and complications for state
and local procurement officers and, as a result, projects funded under the
ARRA were stalled or moved forward slowly. With practically no international obligations covering government procurement at the municipal level,
and only fractionally at the state level, goods eligible for federal procurement
under § 1605 that were substantially transformed in a covered-tradeagreement country, were ineligible for subfederal procurements. This differential application meant that subfederal agencies spending monies under the
"Procuring entity" refers to any state and municipal level agency.
Embassy of Canada, supra note 5, at 2.
17 Ian Austen, To the North, Grumbling Over Trade, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at B3,
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/08/business/global/08buy.html.
18 GPA, supra note 7, at 2.
19 Embassy of Canada, supra note 5, at 4.
20 id.
15
16
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ARRA may have had to pay higher prices for products than those available to
federal agencies; these agencies also faced contracting delays and burdens
not faced by their federal counterparts. 2 1 Although the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure projected the creation of 110,000 jobs and
$20 billion in economic activity, as of May 2009, only six projects worth $15
million had started, creating just seventeen jobs in the United States.22
Also, to avoid the administrative burden associated with applying § 1605
and the potential for reprimand if misapplied, some municipalities otherwise
eligible to use ARRA funds to update their water and sewage infrastructure,
for example, declined stimulus money altogether.23 The application of §1605
at the subfederal level, with "a limited patchwork of international obligations,"24 also led to contradictory results. American companies sourcing
components from Canada were not able to participate in subfederal procurement projects. 25 Thus, although difficult to quantify, documented evidence
suggests that § 1605 generated immediate adverse effects for both Canadian
and American companies.
Other 'Buy American' Legislation
Domestic preference requirements appear in other pieces of United States
federal legislation. The Buy American Act,2 6 originally enacted in 1933,
applies to all United States federal government purchases of goods valued
above a micro-purchase threshold, excluding services.27 Under the Act, all
goods purchased for public use must be produced in the United States. Manufactured items purchased under the legislation must also be manufactured in
the United States from United States materials.28 Similar to § 1605 of the
ARRA, the Act does provide exceptions on the basis of public interest, unreasonable cost, and non-availability. Both NAFTA and the GPA provide
exceptions for federal government purchases under the Buy American Act
for procurements below the thresholds established in each agreement. Specifically, the GPA covers federal purchases at or above 130,000 special
Letter from Calman J. Cohen, President, Emergency Committee for American Trade, to
Marguerite Pridgen, et. al., Re: Comments on OMB Recovery Act Guidance (June 22, 2009),
availableat http://www.ecattrade.com/uploads/content/0A3661DBlDA947F886D3A1A
2FO7Fl2CA.pdf
22 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE, 11 TH CONG., THE AM. RECOVERY
21

& REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009 TRANSP. & INFRASTRUCTURE PROVISIONS IMPLEMENTATION

STATUS AS OF MAY 15, 2009, at 7 (May 21, 2009).
23
24
25

Embassy of Canada, supra note 5.
Id. at 13.
id.

26 Buy American Act, 41 U.S.C. § 10 (a-d) (1933).
27
28

id
id
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drawing rights (SDRs) for supplies and services and 5 million SDRs for construction. 2 9 NAFTA Chapter 10, which covers government procurement,
only applies to federal purchases at or above $50,000 for goods and services
and $6.5 million for construction projects.30
The Buy American Act is distinguishable from the Buy America Act; 31 it
applies to transit-related procurement valued at over $100,000, the funding
for which includes grants administered by the Federal Transit Authority
(FTA) and the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA).3 2 Projects funded
by the FTA and FHWA require one hundred percent United States content
for iron, steel, and manufactured goods used. 3 These two agencies fund
most large transportation contracts in the United States; however, state and
local governments administer the contracts.
Although subfederal exemptions under NAFTA and the GPA will be examined in more detail below, it is worth noting that § 1605 of the ARRA
greatly expanded the domestic preference regimes established in the aforementioned Acts. Specifically, § 1605 attached "Buy American" rules to federal funding for infrastructure projects that would otherwise be covered under NAFTA Chapter 10 and the GPA if not administered by subfederal entities. In other words, by requiring states and municipalities to administer federal funds for infrastructure projects, Congress effectively nullified any "national treatment" protection afforded to Canadian companies bidding on infrastructure contracts, even above the stated thresholds in the GPA and
NAFTA Chapter 10. In this respect, § 1605 was a new barrier to trade.
2. DID THE UNITED STATES CONTRAVENE ITS INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS TO CANADA BY ENACTING 4 1605 OF THE ARRA?
In order to adequately assess whether the United States breached its international obligations to Canada by passing § 1605 of the ARRA, it is necessary to engage in a more detailed analysis of the relevant treaties governing
trade relations between the two nations.

See World Trade Organization, Appendixes and Annexes to the GPA, United States
Annex 1, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/gproc-e/appendicese.htm#taipei (last visited
Aug. 29, 2010) (Converted, these values represent approximately $210,000 and $8.06 million
respectively as of December 1, 2009).
30 See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1001
(c)(i).
31 See Buy America Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5323 (1982).
32 See Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, The Buy
American
and Buy America Acts, http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sell2usgov-vendreaugouvusa/
procurement-marches/buyamerica.aspx?Iang-eng (last visited Dec. 10, 2010).
33 id
29
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NAFTA Chapter 10 & 11
NAFTA Chapter 10 addresses government procurement among member
States. One of its core principles is Article 1003, or the "national treatment"
clause. Under Article 1003, each Party to NAFTA must accord, to the suppliers of goods and services of another Party, treatment no less favorable than
that applied to domestic suppliers.3 4 The protection afforded under Article
1003 applies to federal government entities, government enterprises, and
state and provincial governments listed in Annex 1001.1a-3 over specified
thresholds. While most federal government entities are listed, Article 1024
indicates that the listing of state and provincial entities is subject to negotiations which, to date, have not yet materialized.3 s Accordingly, subfederal
entities in all three countries are not covered by the national treatment criteria
established under Article 1003.
Chapter 11, which governs investment, accords national treatment and
most-favored-nation protection to investors from member states under Article 1102 and 1103, respectively.36 While Canadian companies adversely
affected by § 1605 of the ARRA could take recourse under Chapter I1's investor-to-State dispute settlement mechanism, a number of issues restrict the
viability of this course of action. In ADF Group Inc. v. United States,37 a
Canadian company, ADF Group Inc. (ADF), filed a claim under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) arbitral regime
for damages resulting from the 1982 Buy America Act. ADF argued that the
"Buy America" rules under the Act prevented it from producing steel in Canada for a highway project in Virginia, thus violating NAFTA Chapter 11.38
In its ruling, the tribunal highlighted, among other things, that NAFTA parties brought only federal-level procurement by certain federal government
entities under the coverage of Chapter 10. In addition, disputes arising with
respect to procurement fall within the ambit of State-to-State dispute resolution under NAFTA Chapter 20, or outside the investor-to-State dispute settlement framework set up in Chapter l1.3 In the context of § 1605, the tribunal's decision effectively precludes affected Canadian investors from asserting national treatment protection under NAFTA Chapter 11 through the
investor-to-State dispute resolution regime.
In holding the "Buy America" provision in the Act as consistent with
NAFTA Article 1102, the tribunal highlighted the fact that the "procureSee NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1003.
* Id. art. 1024.
36 Id. art. 1102, 1103.
3
ADF Group Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1 (Jan. 9, 2003),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16586.pdf [hereinafter ADF Group Inc.].
8 Id. at para. 61.
3 Id. at para.95.
34
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ment" in question was administered at the state level. The United States was
entitled to the benefit of NAFTA Article 1108(8)(b), which essentially rendered the provisions of Article 1106(1)(b) and (c) inapplicable in the case of
procurement by a member.4 Article 1106(l)(b) and (c) prohibits signatories
from imposing or enforcing domestic content requirements and preferential
treatment for domestic suppliers. Article 1108, which covers exceptions,
establishes at subsection (8)(b), that the protections provided under Article
1106(1)(b) and (c) do not apply to "procurement by a Party or state enterprise." 4 ' In addition, subsection (7) of Article 1108 holds that national treatment protection afforded to investors under Article 1102 does not apply to
procurement by a Party.4 2 Given these exceptions, and their consideration in
ADF Group, Inc., the United States was not prima facie contravening the
national treatment provisions included in Chapter 11 of the NAFTA by enacting domestic preference rules for government procurement under the
ARRA.
It is also worth noting that the scope of "procurement" annunciated in Article 1001(5) excludes governmental assistance to a public entity or agency
engaged in procurement in the form of financing or funding of the procurement activity by providing "grants, loans, equity infusions, guarantees, [and]
fiscal incentives." 3 According to the tribunal in ADF Group, Inc., this provision implies that a government entity or agency providing or arranging this
type of funding for the purchase of supplies used or to be used in the construction of a government project, is not itself engaged in procurement.4
This is relevant when considering § 1605 of the ARRA in two respects.
First, a significant portion of the ARRA funds are being dispersed through
federal financial assistance vehicles such as grants.45 Under United States
federal procurement law, projects funded by "federal financial assistance" do
not constitute "procurement,"" and are associated with non-procurement
contract agreements, such as grants. As Article 1001(5) excludes grants from
its definition of "procurement," this method of project finance is permissible
under NAFTA. Second, state and municipal governments are administering
nearly eighty percent of funding allocated under the ARRA for infrastructure
projects. Thus, even though funding under the ARRA emanates from the
federal government, by virtue of its composition mainly in the form of grants
Id. at para. 199.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1106 (1)(b), (c).
42 Id. art. 1108
(7).
41 Id. art. 1001 (5)(a).
4 See ADF Group Inc. v. United States, supra note 37, at para. 161.
45 See Embassy of Canada, supra note 5, at 10; see generally Recovery.gov,
htt ://www.recovery.gov/Pages/home.aspx (last visited Dec. 10, 2010).
The Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act, 31 U.S.C §§ 6303-6304 (1982)
(hereinafter Federal Grant].
4
41
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to subfederal entities, the federal government is not engaged in procurement
as defined under NAFTA Article 1001(5), and therefore is not in contravention of its provisions.
Intricacies surrounding funding are somewhat obscured under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO regime, especially as they
pertain to United States obligations under the SCM Agreement.4 7
WTO GPA & the SCM Agreement
In juxtaposition to NAFTA are the United States' procurement obligations to Canada under the WTO and GPA. The GPA includes rules implementing openness, transparency, and non-discrimination with regards to government procurement practices by member States. The Agreement is not part
of the WTO "single-undertaking,"48 and thus only applies to WTO members
that have voluntarily acceded to it. Both Canada and the United States are
signatories.
The GPA only applies to certain "covered" procurements that are defined
in annexes to the Agreement. Coverage is generally grouped into four categories: value of procurement (only contracts exceeding specified value
thresholds); identity of the procuring entity (only those listed in the countryspecific annexes); types of goods and services procured; and the origin of the
goods or services (only from member countries).4 9 In certain respects, the
GPA responds to GATT Article III: 8(a), which exempts government procurement from GATT national treatment obligations included in Article III:
4.50 With the exception of entities listed in the country-annexes to the GPA,
GATT Article III: 8(a) permits government agencies in WTO member countries to enact domestic preference policies in their government procurement
practices. However, for GPA signatories, Article III: 1(b) extends national
treatment protection to suppliers from each member state.
Article I of the GPA defines the technical parameters of what constitutes
"government procurement" under the Agreement, the contours of which are
largely shaped by the voluntary coverage enunciated by each signatory in the
country annexes. The United States, for example, included seventy-nine
federal agencies" as well as select government agencies from thirty-seven

See GPA, supra note 7.
See generallyWorld Trade Organization, Legal Texts: the WTO Agreements,
htt ://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/ursum e.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2010).
See Canada-United States AGP art. I, note 1.
50 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S.
187 (The GATT, with annexes and schedules, is attached to Final Act of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Employment, signed at Geneva, on Oct. 30, 1947).
51 GPA, supra note7, at United States Annex 1.
47
48
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states.52 Canada, on the other hand, included eighty-two federal agencies and
no provincial level entities. In response to Canada's lack of subfederal
commitment, the United States precluded Canada from accessing procureOn the basis of its stated
ment carried out by listed state-level entities.
commitment, therefore, the United States could discriminate against Canadian suppliers bidding on subfederal procurement projects, even those executed
by covered entities under the GPA.
In its general notes to its Annex, the United States also indicated that it
did not consider its procurement coverage to apply to "non-contractual
agreements or any form of government assistance, including cooperative
agreements, grants, loans, equity infusions, guarantees, [and] fiscal incentives." 54 Accordingly, by dispersing "recovery funding" to subfederal entities through federal financial assistance vehicles, such as grants, the United
States did not technically breach its stated obligations to GPA Parties, including Canada.
Less clear, however, is whether § 1605 of the ARRA coincides with the
United States' trade obligations to Canada under the SCM Agreement. As
part of WTO "single undertaking," the SCM Agreement disciplines the use
of subsidies and regulates the actions member states can take to counter the
effects of subsidies. The definition of "subsidy" under Article 1.1 refers to a
financial contribution by a government or "any public body within the territory of the Member... where: (i) the government practice involves the direct
transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans and equity infusions), potential direct
transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees)," and a "benefit is incurred." ss The inclusion of "any public body within the territory," indicates
that the SCM Agreement applies to national as well as subnational governments. 5 6 In addition, Article 3.1(b) prohibits the awarding of subsidies "contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of
domestic over imported goods."5 In tandem, these provisions seem to prohibit the issuance of federal financial assistance under § 1605 by states and
municipalities on the basis of domestic preference criteria. Furthermore,
unlike GATT Article III's national treatment obligation, there is no exclusion
for government procurement from obligations under the SCM Agreement.
Under the Federal Grant and Cooperative Agreement Act, United States
legislators define both "grant agreement" and "cooperative agreement" sepa52

5
54

Id. at United States Annex 2.
Id. at United States, General Notes to Annexes.

Id. at 5.

1 Id. art. 1.1 (a), (1)(i) & (b).
56 See World Trade Organization, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Overview,
htt://www.wto.org/english/tratope/scm e/subs3e.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2010).
GPA, supra note 7, art. 3.1 (b).
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rately from subsidies, loans, and loan guarantees.5 8 Based on this internal
definition, the use of grants or cooperative agreements is distinct from the
practice of subsidization. While this definition may be dispositive of the
United States perspective, it is useful to briefly examine the composite parts
of a "subsidy" as referenced in relevant WTO tribunal decisions.
In Brazil - Aircraft, the Appellate Body indicated that a "financial contribution" and a "benefit" are two separate legal elements that together determine whether a subsidy exists." With regard to a "financial contribution,"
the Panel in US - Export Restraints found that the inclusion of the term in the
text of Article I was meant to guarantee that not all government measures
that confer benefits would be considered subsidies. Specifically, the Panel
opined that "the negotiating history confirms that items (i)-(iii) of that list
(Article 1.1) limit these kinds of measures to the transfer of economic resources from a government to a private entity." 60 In terms of timing, the
Panel in Brazil held that a government need not effectuate such a transfer or
potential transfer for a subsidy to exist: "as soon as there is such a practice, a
subsidy exists, and the question whether the practice involves a direct transfer of funds or a potential direct transfer of funds is not relevant to the existence of a subsidy."6 ' Finally, in considering the meaning of "benefit," the
Appellate Body held that a financial contribution will only confer a "benefit"
if it is provided "on terms that are more advantageous than those that would
have been available to the recipient on the market." 62
Notwithstanding the United States' declaratory separation of "grant" and
"cooperative agreements" from "subsidy" agreements, the nature and scope
of ARRA funding, in many respects, meets the Panel criteria established
above. In particular, the transfer of economic resources via "federal financial
assistance" to state and municipal governments and then to private entities
meets the financial contribution criteria. Furthermore, the actual transfer of
funds need not eventuate for the subsidy to exist. This addresses the argument that while federal legislators attached domestic preference rules to
ARRA money, states and municipal governments need not access or utilize
this funding. The fact that accessing ARRA funding is contingent upon its
use, in this case on domestic supplies, establishes a "practice" upon which a
subsidy is based. It is arguable that the legislative intent of the stimulus
funding under the ARRA was meant to provide domestic suppliers with
Federal Grant § 6302 (1).
5 Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Export FinancingProgrammefor Aircraft,
7.12-.14,
WT/DS46/AP/R (Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter Brazil].
6
Panel Report, UnitedStates - Measures TreatingExport Restraintsas Subsidies,
8.65, .73, WT/DS194/R (June 29, 2001).
61 Brazil, supra note 59, 1 7.13.
62 Appellate Body Report, Canada- Measures Affecting the Export of CivilianAircraft,
149, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 4, 2000).
58
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guaranteed access to infrastructure spending, while at the same time artificially squeezing out foreign competitors unable to meet the stringent domestic content requirements. Thus, based on interpretive criteria established in
relevant WTO jurisprudence cited above, the United States may be in breach
of SCM Agreement Articles 1.1 and 3.1(b) by the enactment of § 1605 of the
ARRA.
The Vienna Convention & the International Law Commission's Articles on
State Responsibility
The enactment of § 1605 and its administration by subfederal entities also
gives rise to a number of customary international law issues. First, Article 26
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 63 requires the parties to a
binding treaty perform such treaties in good faith. Based on the preceding
analysis of United States trade obligations under the NAFTA and the GPA, it
is difficult to assert the United States is in breach of Article 26 by enacting a
domestic preference provision. However, it is not entirely clear whether the
same can be said of United States obligations under Article 1.1 and 3.1(b) of
the SCM Agreement. Here one might also consider Article 27 of the Vienna
Convention, which prohibits a state from invoking the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. Given this provision, it is difficult for the United States to argue that, because domestic procurement law considers grants and cooperative agreements as distinct from
"subsidies," it is technically not in breach of the SCM provisions.
Evidently, this line of dialogue gives rise to a conflict of laws discussion.
While Article VI of the United States Constitution places treaties on equal
footing with the "supreme law of the land," 6 5 the later-in-time rule, which
allows subsequent United States statutes to override treaty provisions, suggests otherwise. In Beard v. Greene,6 6 the Supreme Court invoked the laterin-time principle in denying habeas corpus and certiorari to a Paraguayan
national sentenced to death in Virginia. In a per curiam opinion, the Court
stated the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations had been overridden by
the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. With this said,
issues pertaining to United States reception of international law are largely
muted by the dispute settlement procedures available to Canada under the
WTO regime should it wish to address "Buy America" in this manner.
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The administration of § 1605 by subfederal entities also gives rise to
questions concerning state responsibility. In particular, it is a general postulate of customary international law that acts carried out by governmental
organs and entities are attributable to the State and that the State, as a subject
of international law, is responsible for the acts of all its organs and territorial
units. This rule is generally formulated in Article 4 of the International Law
Commission's Articles of State Responsibility:
The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State
under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds in the
organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the
central Government or of a territorial unit of the State.68
When applied to § 1605, Article 4 renders irrelevant which level of government is executing the procurement measure. As the conduct of subnational governments falls under the ambit of State responsibility in this provision, discriminatory procurement practices carried out by a state or municipality may be attributable to the federal government. This greatly diminishes
assertions that current United States international obligations may permit
"Buy American" rules because they are administered by governmental agencies not covered under the NAFTA or the GPA.
The tribunal considered this argument in the ADF Group, Inc. arbitration.
In their ruling, the tribunal highlighted the fact that federal and subfederal
procurement measures are subject to NAFTA Chapter 10 only if and to the
extent that such measures are issued by an entity listed in the negotiated
Schedule of a NAFTA Party in Annex 1001.1a-3. 6 9 In other words, the inclusion of national and subnational procurement measures in NAFTA Chapter 10 is at least an implicit recognition that the signatories deem procurement at each level of government to be separate and distinct. Accordingly,
while Article 4 seems to group the conduct of subnational governments under
the heading of State responsibility, the voluntary demarcation between levels
of government enunciated by NAFTA and GPA members seem to nullify this
attribution.

Int'l Law Comm'n, DraftArticles on the Responsibility of Statesfor Internationally
Wrongful Acts, art. 4, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
69 ADF Group Inc., supra note 37, at 167.
68
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3. (A) WHAT OPTIONS. IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, WERE
AVAILABLE TO CANADA IN RESPONSE TO 4 1605 OF THE ARRA?
The range of options available to Canada in response to "Buy America"
was largely shaped by underlying political considerations. Before considering the option eventually pursued, that being the bilateral negotiations resulting in the Canada-United States AGP, it is informative to analyze the limited
nature of other avenues Canada could have taken in combating "Buy America."
'Public Interest' Waiver under § 1605
As discussed earlier, § 1605(b) of the ARRA allows procurement entities
to waive the "Buy American" criteria based on non-availability of domestic
supplies, unreasonable cost, and inconsistency with the public interest. Although the first two exemptions are largely fact driven, it may be worthwhile
to consider how United States courts have examined the definition of "public
interest" in the context of procurement by a public entity.
In C. Sanchez & Son, Inc. v. United States, 70 the Federal Court of Appeals
considered the application of a public interest waiver under the Buy American Act. In its decision, the court generally viewed "public interest" from a
cost perspective and utilized a prior executive order71 on government purchases for guidance. It held that a waiver should be issued on the grounds of
public interest when the cost of domestic materials exceeded the price of like
foreign materials plus six percent.72 At the district level, however, United
States courts have examined factors other than cost in assessing "public interest." In Conti EnterprisesInc. v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority,73 for example, the court held that, although it would be in the
public's fiscal interest to award a public work contract to the lowest bidder,
"the Buy America laws were enacted to promote the counterbalancing of
public fiscal interest with protecting and creating jobs for American [steel]
workers."74 As the ARRA imbues counterbalancing similar objectives, it is
unclear whether Canadian companies would have succeeded in receiving a
waiver from § 1605 based on "public interest." Furthermore, discretion to
issue a waiver of this kind lies in the hands of federal granting officials and is
considered on a case-by-case basis for each project.7 ' As highlighted earlier,
70 6 F.3d 1539, 1545-46 (1993).

41 U.S.C. § 10a-d (1988).
6 F.3d at 1546.
" No. 03-5345, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19848 at *28 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 14, 2003).
74 Id. at *27.
7 See generally, JAYSON MYERS, CAN. MFRS. & Exps., BuY AMERICAN BRIEFING
DOCUMENT 9 (2009), http://www.ciph.com/Downloads/advocacyLink/Buy/20American
7
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the lengthy amount of time required for such procedures, coupled with the
ARRA's stated mandate of moving projects forward quickly, rendered this
option unrealistic for affected Canadian companies, notwithstanding the significant intra-industry trade across the Canada-United States border.
Arbitration
As a party to the WTO, Canada has access to the Organization's dispute
settlement process. As highlighted above, it is possible that § 1605 of the
ARRA contravenes United States trade obligations to Canada under Article
1.1 and 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. "Federal financial assistance" awards
based on "Buy America" criteria would fall under the "actionable category,"
and, if viewed as local content subsidies, would be subject to challenge.
Were Canada to succeed in establishing that federal financial assistance constitutes a subsidy as defined in Article 1.1, it would then need to establish an
injury to a domestic industry and demonstrate a causal link between the subsidy and the injury. In the context of § 1605, it is arguable whether there
was sufficient empirical evidence, from the time of the ARRA's enactment to
the eventual signing of the Canada-United States AGP, to demonstrate injury
to a Canadian industry. Other than a handful of heavily publicized Canadian
companies that were negatively affected by § 1605, data revealing an adverse
industry wide impact was not readily apparent in the media.
However, sufficient empirical evidence demonstrating "injury" may not
be as much of a stumbling block in light of GATT Article XXIII, which covers a nullification or impairment complaint. 79 This provision describes a
right of legal action arising out of circumstances in which there has been no
outright inconsistency or breach of a legal obligation.80 The complaint is
designed to deal with the contingency that the standard legal commitments in
a trade agreement may fail to preserve the overall balance of concessions
reasonably expected when the agreement was negotiated.8 ' As an inconsistency is not alleged, the aim of the complaint is not the withdrawal of the
%20Brief%2OJune%2009%20Revised%2ONov/2009.pdf
76 Embassy of Canada, supra note
5.
77 Id.
7
See generally Les Whittington, CanadiansCry Foul as Buy American Policy hits home,
Toronto Star, Nov. 13, 2009, http://www.thestar.com/news/canadalarticle/725301 --america-ssteel-curtain-thwarts-canada.
7 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Art. XXIII, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153
(1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994].
8o Allen J. Hertz, Shaping the Trident: IntellectualProperty Under NAFTA, Investment
ProtectionAgreements and[sic] at the World Trade Organization,23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261

(1997).
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impugned measure, but rather to give the successful complainant "a compensatory adjustment to restore the balance of interests." 82 In order to establish a
nullification claim, however, the complainant would have to sufficiently
demonstrate that the defendant's new measures impair benefits which had
been reasonably anticipated when the negotiations were concluded.
In Canada's case, Article XXIII provides an avenue through which it can
circumvent having to demonstrate actual injury to domestic suppliers. This
being said, Canada would still need to establish that § 1605 of the ARRA
impairs the benefit it anticipated receiving when it negotiated the SCM
Agreement and, in particular, Article 3.1 (b). Given Canada's voluntary accession to the GPA after the negotiation of the SCM Agreement, it would be
difficult to assert that Canada expected to receive national treatment protection in the procurement markets of other Members. It is worth mentioning
that in Japan - Film, the Panel held that the nullification remedy should be
treated as an exceptional concept, and highlighted the fact that it has only
been considered eight times by arbitral tribunals.84 In clarifying, the Panel
opined that "the reason for this caution is straightforward... Members negotiate the rules that they agree to follow and only exceptionally would they
expect to be challenged for actions not in contravention of those rules."
Countermeasures Permissible Under International Law
Were Canada to succeed in demonstrating a violation of a benefit accruing under GATT Article XXIII, an Arbitral Panel could authorize the suspension of trade concessions enjoyed by the United States.86 Furthermore, under
Article 7.9 of the SCM Agreement, an Appellate Panel could authorize countermeasures, "commensurate with the degree and nature of the adverse effects determined to exist, unless the dispute settlement body ("DSB") decides
by consensus to reject the request."87
Customary international law similarly entitles Canada to a proportionate
response to "Buy America." Under Article 49 of the ILC's Articles on State
Responsibility, countermeasures against the United States for injuries incurred by Canadian suppliers are permitted in order to induce the United
82
83

id
id

8
Panel Report, Japan- Measures Affecting Consumer PhotographicFilm and Paper,
WT/DS44/R, (Mar. 31,1998).
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86 Hertz, supra note 80.
87 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Art. 7.9, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 (1994),
reprintedin The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 275 (1999).
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States to comply with its obligations under the SCM Agreement (assuming a
successful claim could be established)." However, countermeasures, such as
the enactment of a "Buy Canadian" policy with respect to subnational government procurement, should be fashioned in a manner so as to permit the
resumption of United States obligations under the SCM Agreement.
Thus, while technically there was little preventing Canada from enacting
a domestic preference criteria in response to § 1605 of the ARRA, the necessity of such a response had to be weighed against (1) the fact that Canada had
yet to liberalize subfederal procurement markets under the GPA, and (2) the
likelihood of successfully establishing that § 1605 contravenes Articles 1.1
and 3.1(b) of the SCM Agreement.
A General Exemption for Canada
Given the limited and uncertain nature of the aforementioned options
Canada could have pursued in an attempt to remedy injuries arising from
§1605, pursuing bilateral negotiations became the most realistic alternative
for policymakers. At the center of such negotiations was a general exemption for Canada from "Buy America." For the Americans, however, reciprocal access to Canadian procurement markets was the primary objective driving their negotiators. 90
Aside from the obvious political considerations pervading this course of
action, it is worth noting that the President holds the constitutional authority
to waive the "Buy America" rules under the ARRA as they apply to Canada.
The statutory basis for such an exemption is § 2511 of the Trade Agreements
Act of 1979,91 which permits the President to:
waive, in whole or in part, with respect to eligible products [and suppliers of such products] from any foreign country . . . the application

of any law, procedure, or practice regarding Government procurement
that would, if applied .

.

. result in treatment less favorable than that

92
accorded to United States products and suppliers of such products.

Furthermore, under subsection (b), the President can designate an eligible
country for exemption if that country becomes part of NAFTA (which Cana-

Int'l Law Conim'n, supra note 68, art. 49.
Id. art. 49.3.
9 See generally Andrew Mayeda, U.S. Accepts 'Premise' ofBuy American Exemptionfor
Canada,FIN. POST, Oct. 19, 2009, http://www.financialpost.com/accepts+premise+American
+exemption+Canada/2120915/story.html.
9' 19 U.S.C. 13 § 2511 (1979).
92 Id.§ 2511 (a).
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da is) and will provide "appropriate reciprocal competitive government opportunities to United States products and suppliers of such products."9 3
3. (B) TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THE CANADA-UNITED STATES
AGP ADDRESS CANADA'S DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM § 1605 OF
THE ARRA AND PROVIDE A FRAMEWORK FOR MANAGING
FUTURE 'BUY AMERICA' PROVISIONS?
On February 16, 2010, Canada and the United States signed an agreement
intended to resolve "Buy America" as it applied to Canada, while at the same
time provide greater access to procurement markets in both countries. In
particular, under Article 3 of the Agreement, Canada addressed its lack of
subfederal procurement commitments under the WTO-GPA by extending to
the United States access to procurement by provincial and territorial government agencies for goods and service contracts over 355,000 SDRs, and construction services over 5 million SDRs.94 In exchange, the United States
agreed, under Article 4, to allow Canada access to its subfederal GPA commitments. Furthermore, the United States agreed to exempt Canada from the
domestic purchasing requirement under § 1605 for seven federal programs
receiving funding under the ARRA.95
Other noteworthy provisions include Article 6, which sets out a two-year
expiration date for the Agreement. In addition, under Article 9, the Parties
pledged to enter into discussions meant to deepen, on a reciprocal basis, existing procurement commitments, as well as engage in expedited consultations on any matter related to government procurement. Article 10 further
requires the commencement of consultations between the Parties where disputes arise over interpretation of the Agreement.9 6 Finally, under article 14,
either Party can withdraw from the Agreement upon written notification.
In assessing the merits of the Agreement, a number of points are illustrative. First, while Canadian companies have access to seven federal programs
funded under the ARRA, this access is limited. In particular, ARRA funding
for the Clean Water and Drinking Water State Revolving Funds, access to
which was provided under the Agreement,97 had already been allocated by
the time the Canada-United States AGP was signed in February. Because all
states had allocated their entitlements under these revolving funds by the
ARRA mandated deadline of February 17, 2010, none of this funding was

Id. § 2511 (b) (1) (A-B).
U.S.-Canada GPA, supra note 6, art. 3.
9 Id. art. 7.
96 Id. art. 9, 10.
9
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covered by the Agreement." Hence, for Canadian suppliers of water and
wastewater technologies, the Canada-United States AGP did little to provide
access to projects funded under the ARRA.
Within Canada, the Agreement received mixed reactions. Civil society
organizations, for example, took issue with the federal government's failure
to seriously consult with municipalities and labor organizations during the
early stages of the negotiation process.99 Such criticisms were furthered by
suggestions that Canada offered up far too much for only partial access to
ARRA funding and a limited number of state government agencies. However, in a Parliamentary Report on the Canada-United States AGP, International Trade Minister Peter Van Loan responded to such censures by citing the
fact that procurement practices at the provincial and municipal levels have
long been open:
The municipalities participating through the Federation of Canadian
Municipalities and the provinces all indicated that their procurement
processes were unrestricted, by and large. Any restrictions they had
were reflected in this agreement in the carve-outs under the WTO procurement agreement provisions. As such, to the extent that they had
sensitive sectors they wished to protect within procurement, that was
done.' 00
According to Minister Van Loan, therefore, Canadian companies gained a
partial exemption from the domestic content requirements under the ARRA
in exchange for a formal recognition of preexisting Canadian subfederal procurement policies, including exceptions and carveouts.' 0
In addition to the Minister's comments, it is important to recognize that
the Canada-United States AGP, however limited, offers a framework for
dealing with future domestic content provisions. This mechanism, loosely
established under Article 9, is especially important when considering the fact
that trade restrictive language continues to surface in proposed congressional
legislation. The American Renewable Energy Jobs Act, 0 2 for example, ref98 UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, US-CANADA TRADE
AGREEMENT AND How IT AFFECTS Buy AMERICAN REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARRA (2010),
available at http://water.epa.gov/aboutow/eparecovery/upload/US-CanadaAgreement
and BA.pdf.

9 Council of Canadians, Divergent Views on 'Buy American' deal with US, but trade
committee fails to demand priorconsultation infuture, June 4, 2010,
htt ://www.canadians.org/tradeblog/?p-866.
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erences § 1605 of the ARRA. Furthermore, the Agreement might also be
viewed as an opportunity for both Canada and the United States to move
toward liberalizing procurement markets not covered by the "deal" that have
traditionally been closed. Mass transit, for example, continues to represent a
sizeable procurement market in both countries and yet remains unaffected by
this, or any other agreement governing Canada-United States procurement.
CONCLUSION
At the center of Canada's most recent trade dispute with the United States
was a lack of coverage under both of its major trade agreements. With subfederal entities largely excluded from NAFTA Chapter 10 and the WTOGPA, the United States was not prima facie contravening obligations to Canada under either. Less clear, however, is whether § 1605 undermines United
States obligations to Canada under the SCM Agreement. Furthermore, questions abound as to whether the recently signed Canada-United States AGP
will live up to its potential for integrating procurement markets in both countries. As stepping stone legislation to a more permanent deal, one might also
question whether policymakers on either side of the border have spent all of
their political currency in securing it. Especially in the United States, there
may be little interest among legislators to begin talks that would penetrate
long-standing procurement legislation such as the Buy American Act. Furthermore, without a dispute settlement process built into the Canada-United
States AGP, the agreement sits atop goodwill enforcement, and any breach of
its terms will result in the withdrawal of the affected party, thereby diminishing the accord's durability.
However, should negotiators succeed in striking a more permanent
agreement on government procurement, the deal, however incomplete, offers
a tremendous opportunity for moving Canada-United States trade relations in
the direction of a single integrated North American market. Furthermore,
with Canada being so heavily reliant on export markets, the deal signals to
European Union negotiators the seriousness of completing the ongoing Canada-European Union free trade talks. Perhaps in this indirect sense, Canada
may end up winning much more from the bilateral deal than was originally
expected.
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